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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRAcTicEs LEGIS-
LATION-RELIGION AS A BONA FIDE QUALIFICATION FOR EMPLOY-
MENT.-The State Commission Against Discrimination permitted the
Arabian-American Oil Company to require that an applicant for em-
ployment fill out a visa for travel in Saudi Arabia when it appeared
reasonable that such applicant would be required to work there.'
Saudi Arabian policy excludes all Jews irrespective of citizenship and
anyone requesting a visa must state his religion as a prerequisite.
On application for an order annulling the Commission's determina-
tion under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Act, the Court
held any inquiry into religion by a non-religious organization was
violative of both the "spirit and letter of the State's anti-discrimination
law," 2 and under no circumstances could constitute a bona fide occu-
pational qualification. 3 A nerican Jewish Congress v. Carter, 190
N.Y.S2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
The term "civil rights" ordinarily includes all those rights of an
individual which depend upon the laws of the community of which
he is a member.4 It embraces rights due one citizen from another
with a civil cause of action available if they are denied.5 Civil rights
depend on the constitution or statutes for their enjoyment and have
been distinguished from natural rights which exist per se regardless
of law, until their exercise is prevented by legal fiat.8 Civil rights
I The following is a statement made by Commissioner Carter: "The ruling
of the commission in this case is an application of the consistent view of this
agency first made in connection with Saudi Arabia in 1950. This ruling held
that in matter affecting the national security S.C.A.D. [State Commission
Against Discrimination] will be guided by statements of the Federal Govern-
ment as to the best interests of the United States. It further held that when
a job applicant must travel to a foreign country to perform a job, S.C.A.D.
will permit the employer to determine whether the applicant can satisfy the
entrance requirements as a prerequisite to employment." N.Y. Times, July 17,
1959, p. 23, col. 4.2 N.Y. ExEcuTnE LAw §§ 290-301 (Supp. 1959).
3 N.Y. Exzcu=rrv LAw § 296(1) (c) (Supp. 1959). "It shall be an un-
lawful employment practice: For any employer . . . to use any form of
application for employment or to make any inquiry in connection with pros-
pective employment, which expresses, directly or indirectly, any limitation,
specification or discrimination as to age, race, creed, color or national origin
. . . unless based upon a bona fide occupational- qualification." Ibid.
4Bowles v. Habermann, 95 N.Y. 246, 247 (1884).
5 Commonwealth v. Shimpeno, 160 Pa. Super. 104, 50 A.2d 39, 43 n.2
(1946).
I Sult v. Gilbert, 148 Fla. 31, 3 So. 2d 729, 731 (1941).
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include the right of every citizen to seek redress of wrongs and the
enforcement of his rights in the courts.7
The right of each citizen to all the privileges and immunities of
every other citizen was incorporated in the United States Constitu-
tion.8 The fourteenth amendment specifically prohibits state legisla-
tion and action of every kind which denies a person life, liberty or
property without due process of law, or which prevents his equal
protection under the laws. Until appropriate government action shall
declare that the right to employment without unfair discrimination is
a civil right, it has been strongly contended that Congress cannot
effect the elimination of unfair practices without seriously impinging
upon states' rights.9
Inroads were made in this area, however, during the Second
World War when it was obvious to the federal government that the
available manpower for defense work was being seriously limited by
unfair discrimination. To break down this national defense threat
and to eliminate the contradiction between democratic principles and
unfair discrimination in fact, the Committee on Fair Employment
Practice was created by executive order.'0 Equal employment op-
portunities were afforded all qualified persons working on government
contracts paid for from public funds. Such persons were entitled to
a fair and equitable treatment in all aspects of employment." The
method of executive order served also to assure fair employment
practices within the federal establishment.' 2
The New York State Constitution, in addition to the above
federal action, extends a guarantee against discrimination in civil
rights to all persons within the state.' 3 It also affords equal protec-
tion and remedies to all.14 As a fulfillment of the provisions on civil
rights in the state constitution, the opportunity to obtain employment
without discrimination because of race, creed, color or national origin
7 State v. Powers, 51 N.J.L. 432, 17 Atl. 969, 970 (Sup. Ct. 1889).
8 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2.
9 For discussion of aspects of this problem, see Hearings on S. 984 Before
a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 645-749 (1947). The proposed bill declared the right to
employment without discrimination because of race, religion, color, national
origin or ancestry to be a civil right of all the people of the United States.
Id. at 805. This bill was never enacted.
10 Carter, Practical Considerations of Anti-Discrimination Legislation-
Experience under the New York Law Against Discrimination, 40 CoRNz L.Q.
40-41 (1954).
"'Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
12 Exec. Order No. 9980, 13 Fed. Reg. 4311 (1948). This applies to the
Post Office, Veterans Administration and executive agencies in general.
13 N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 11. "No person shall, because of race, color, creed
or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other
person, . . . firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency




has been declared a civil right.' 5 State policy considers discrimina-
tion repugnant to its constitution, a threat to the rights and proper
privileges of its inhabitants and a menace to the foundations of a
free democratic state.1 6
It has been said that since every man has a natural right to
choose for whom he will work and conversely every man has a right
to determine whom he will hire, state action should be discouraged
when it interferes with private employment.17  The United States
Supreme Court has ruled that state action denying the right to work
for a living goes to the essence of personal freedom and opportunity
secured by the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amend-
ment.' s Conversely, state fair employment practices legislation which
guarantees non-discrimination in private employment has been upheld
as not violative of the due process and equal protection clauses. 19
However, early state and municipal attempts to eliminate unfair
discrimination in areas including employment proved ineffective be-
cause enforcement depended on prosecution by local officials or civil
action by the one claiming such discrimination. 20 This problem was
overcome by establishing an administrative agency to evaluate com-
plaints by peaceful settlement so that recourse to the courts and con-
tempt proceedings would be required only in extreme cases. 21 New
York set in operation its State Commission Against Discrimination
to provide equal employment opportunities by creating a community
attitude favoring anti-discrimination measures.2 2  In this way expert
treatment of the complaint could be afforded without the expenses of
a civil suit.
The instant case is significant although the Court's reversal of
the Commission's decision still does not afford Jews an opportunity
to work in Saudi Arabia. The Court admits an exemption when any
other decision would interfere with the functioning of a religious
organization, but it denies that any such exemption can extend to
l5 N.Y. ExEcuiw LAW § 291.
16 N.Y. ExEcunv LAW § 290 (Supp. 1959).
27 See, e.g., People v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 306 Ill. 486, 138 N.E. 155(1923).Is Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
19 Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945). New York has such
legislation.
2oKoNviTz, THE CoNsrnUnON AND CIVIL RIGHTS 30, 115-21 (1950).
22 N.Y. EXECUTIV LAW §9 295, 298 (Supp. 1959).22 N.Y. ExEcu=ivE LAW §9 290, 293-95 (Supp. 1959). Similar agencies have
been established and fair employment practices legislation enacted in: CoLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-19-3 (1953) ; CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 31-123 (1958) ; KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1003 (Supp. 1957); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 56(1952); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.458(5) (1957); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 363.05(1957); N.J. REv. STAT. § 18:25-1 (Supp. 1957); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-4-6
(1953); Oma. Rav. STAT. § 659.040 (1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 956(1952); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §28-5-8 (1956); Wis. STAT. ANN. §111.31
(1957).
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cover situations such as this.28 As a consequence of the decision, if
the Aramco Oil Company hires engineers in New York, it must em-
ploy them without knowing whether it can use them in its oil fields
in Saudi Arabia. It may thus be argued that the Court is forcing
the company to hire men it- may not be able to use or to discontinue
its contract with Saudi Arabia.24 Perhaps of more significance is
the fact that the holding still does not open employment oppor-
tunities to Jews, particularly if performance can only take place in
Saudi Arabia.
The Court is setting up an absolute nile: there can be no bona
fide qualification of religion for employment in a non-religious
organization.2 5 It has interpreted the state anti-discrimination statute
as severely limiting the area of the bona fide qualification exemption.
Even in the senate resolution for the elimination of discrimination
cited by the Court, such attempts at elimination are modified by
"reasonable effort" in dealing with foreign nations.2 6  In the past,
state fair employment practices commissions, including that of New
York, have interpreted "bona fide occupational qualification" to in-
clude those attributes necessary for the proper performance of the
work itself although they have excluded such grounds as possible
employee friction, loss of customer good will or a traditional national
or religious atmosphere in a business. 27
The rule as established in the instant case is based on the strong
public policy of New York, although at the time the case was being
argued a State Department official was reported in the newspapers
to have said:
[A]ny finding . . . which would compel Aramco to employ persons of
the Jewish faith in Saudi Arabia . . . would most certainly prejudice the
company's operations in that country and would probably adversely affect the
United States' interests there as well.28
Traditionally, power over external affairs is not shared by the states
but is vested exclusively in the national government. 2  State policy
cannot be permitted to alter or defeat national foreign policy since it
would "imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex
the peace of nations." 30 It would seem, however, that the failure of
the State Department to take any direct action with respect to the
Aramco situation runs contra to the position as originally announced.
23 American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218, 221 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
24 The principal asset of Aramco is an exclusive agreement with King
Saud to exploit Saudi Arabian oil. N.Y. Times, July 19, 1959, § 4, p. 2, col. 6.
25 American Jewish Congress v. Carter, supra note 23, at 221.
26 American Jewish Congress v. Carter, szpra note 23, at 222.
27 See, e.g., N.Y. REPORT OF PROGRESS OF STATE Co tISsioN AGAINST
D'iscn sim xAoN 47 (1950).
28 N.Y. Times, July 19, 1959, § 4, p. 2, col. 7.29 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942).
30 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918).
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By this decision the Commission must now adopt the absolute
rule set up by the Court which restricts the flexibility existing under
earlier Commission decisions. The Commission's original determina-
tion in the Aramco matter was to prevent unfair discrimination in
Aramco's New York offices but to permit this discrimination where
a visa is necessary for an applicant to go to Saudi Arabia. It will be
interesting to observe whether the State Department will take any
affirmative action, if and when an appeal is taken in this case.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-GRAND JURY-AssERTION OF PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION NOT REQUIRED OF PROSPECTrvE
DEFENANT.-Defendant was subpoenaed to appear before a grand
jury, and after being examined, was indicted for conspiracy and for
giving bribes to public officers. Pursuant to Section 149 of the Judi-
ciary Law,' he moved directly to the Appellate Division, Third De-
partment, which dismissed the indictment on the ground that he had
acquired immunity from prosecution for the crime to which he had
been compelled to testify, even though Section 2447 of the New York
Penal Law 2 provides for a grant of immunity to a witness only when
he has claimed his privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant
had at no time claimed his privilege. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that since defendant was before the grand jury as a pros-
pective defendant, and not merely as a witness, he could not be com-
pelled to testify at all. Since the defendant had been compelled to
testify, his privilege against self-incrimination had been violated, and,
consequently, the indictment predicated on his testimony was void.
The Court of Appeals specifically left open the question whether the
violation of defendant's constitutional privilege also afforded him an
immunity from subsequent prosecution. People v. Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d
214, 160 N.E.2d 468, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959).
Section 2447 of the Penal Law was enacted to correct some of
the deficiencies found in statutes which preceded it.3 These defi-
ciencies were, for the most part, products of two conflicting philos-
ophies; on the one band there prevailed the idea that "no person...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
'N.Y. JuDriAyY LAw § 149(2) (Supp. 1959) provides: "A motion in-
volving a matter pending before such extraordinary special or trial term shall
be made returnable at such term, or, at the option of the moving party, at
a term of the appellate division of the supreme court in the department in
which such . . . term is being held."2 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2447 (Supp. 1959).
3 See 1953 LEG. Doc. No. 68, THIED REPORT, N.Y. SrATE CRIME CoMr-
missION 14-15 (1953).
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